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Abstract: Many call for research invites for further investigation of the underlying processes, practices 
and specificities of governance in the network context. Through an examination of what governance 
involves and how does it occur in a French cluster of video game companies, our multimethod study 
provide useful insights in the functions and purposes of governance in an inter-organizational and 
collaborative context, the main tools and mechanisms that are being used and the structure supporting 
these  purposes  and  mechanisms.  Our  findings  shed  also  light  upon  the  processual  nature  of 
governance in network context. Governance is a set of processes, or a “meta-process”, that are geared 
toward the creation, the maintenance and the evolution of collaboration relationships and the network as 
a collective actor. We refer to this process of governance functioning, evolution and continuous (re) 
evaluation as governance work.   




Introduction & theoretical background 
Supposed to be an efficient and viable alternative to markets and hierarchies, inter organizational 
networks (hereafter networks), have been thoroughly debated in different literature streams including, 
but  not  limited  to,  strategic  management,  organizational  theory  and  behavior,  sociology,  public 
administration etc (Provan et al. 2007; Borgatti & Foster 2003). Whether to gain on transaction or 
productivity  costs,  to  improve  inter-organizational  learning  or  produce  new  knowledge  and  skills, 
networks are described in the literature as a superior governing form that outperform both markets and 
hierarchies by offering the advantages associated to both forms without their limitations (Ahmadjian & 
Lincoln 2001, Dyer & Singh 1998, Grandori & Soda 1995, Gulati & Gargiulo 1999). Thus, research is 
moving from a view of networks as a hybrid form on a continuum between markets and hierarchy 
towards  their  conceptualization  as  a  distinct  form  of  governance  with  its  own  features  and 
characteristics (Grandori 1997, Grandori & Soda 1995, Powell 1990). As such, and because of the 
youth  of  this  organizational  form,  research  has  primarily  strived  to  understand  the  motives  and 
rationales behind its selection. Studies have paid attention mainly to the conditions that will drive firms 
to make, ally or buy. The focus has also been on how they can reap benefits from their network 
membership and collaborative behavior and ultimately get a competitive advantage (Provan et al. 2007, 
Provan & Kenis 2007, Ring & Van De Ven 1994, Porter 1998, Ebers 1997).    
 However,  recent  calls  for  research  are  inviting  scholars  to  go  beyond  these  questions  and  try  to 
understand network governance and open up the black box of network functioning (Ebbers & Wijnberg 
2009,  Humphreys  2008,  O’Mahony  &  Ferraro  2007,  Provan  et  al.  2007,  Provan  &  Kenis  2007, 
Rodriguez et al. 2007, Winkler 2006; Ehlinger et al. 2007). There’s a need to investigate how collective 
action  is  governed,  organized  and  coordinated  in  the  network  context.  Behind  these  new 
preoccupations  are  several  theoretical  gaps  and  practical  concerns.  As  noted  by  Provan  &  Kenis 
(2007), networks have been conceived, so far, as “undifferentiated forms” (p. 232). Yet, the reality 
shows that networks can vary in forms, aims, origins and structuring processes and thus it could be 3	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misleading to consider them as a unified and homogenous organizational form (Panicia 1998, Provan et 
al. 2007, Provan & Kenis 2007, Rodriguez et al. 2007, Winkler 2006;). Moreover, the proliferation of 
networks and collaborative arrangements and their polymorphous nature is contradictory with a study of 
network governance as solely a choice between different governing alternatives. What is more, reality 
shows that collaborative arrangements do not always fulfill their promise of positive outcomes for firms 
(Ahmadjian & Lincoln 2001, Bathelt et al. 2004, Dyer & Singh 1998, Gulati & Nickerson 2008, Gulati & 
Gargiulo 1999, Humphrey & Schmitz 2002, Granovetter, 1985). Researchers begin considering the dark 
side  of  networks.  The  organizational  and  managerial  dilemmas  and  problems  raised  by  this 
organizational form during its creation and its evolution require a better understanding of how the 
actions of the different network members are organized, governed and regulated in order to reach 
collective outcomes.  
Being  often  considered  as  informal  collaborative  arrangements  based  on  voluntary  actions,  social 
relationships  and  bonds  of  trust  and  solidarity,  networks  are  situated  by  many,  scholars  and 
practitioners alike, as being outside of the scope of governance in its traditional meaning (Borgatti & 
Foster 2003, Gereffi et al. 2005, O’Mahony & Ferraro 2007, Provan & Kenis 2007, Rodriguez et al. 
2007,  Winkler  2006).  Governance  is  generally  associated  to  matters  of  allocation  of  authority  and 
power, of legal contracting, and of crafting of coordination and control mechanisms that ensure that 
management puts the principal’s interests above its own (Fama & Jensen 1983). However, networks 
bring together and require the cooperation of heterogeneous organizations and collective actors each 
having its own interests, ways of organizing and organizational culture. Multilateral coordination of 
collective joint actions require, generally on a voluntary basis, the interaction of these organizational 
actors for the achievements of collective outcomes that are determined at the whole network level and 
thus supposed to satisfy and bring utility to the majority of the participants. On the other hand, networks 
don’t have at their disposal the traditional bureaucratic tools that permit the allocation of authority and 
thus accountability in the corporate context. Besides, many other problems which are particular to the 4	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network context could be expected to influence the network governance, its design and its functioning in 
ways that are different from what is known or done in the classical corporate context. Some of these 
specificities stems from the polymorphous nature of the network, its flexible and continuously moving 
boundaries, the lack of bureaucratic and authority tools and mechanisms that allow for accountability 
and clear decision-making and sharing of the created value afterward (Ahmadjian & Lincoln 2001, Bell 
2005, Dyer & Singh 1998, Ebbers & Wijnberg 2009, Gulati & Nickerson 2008, O’Mahony & Ferraro 
2007, Porter 1998, Uzzi 1997). Moreover, networks do not always pursue economic and efficiency aims. 
More than often, networks are founded and created for relational or institutional aims. As such, they are 
not always oriented toward the production of economic goods.   
This research takes a step forward toward filling these gaps by examining, empirically, how a network is 
governed and thus how a governance system is designed and what actually governance involves in a 
network context. Through our examination of the governance system in a French cluster specialized in 
the video game industry we tried to open up the black box of network governance and the processes 
and practices underlying it. Our in-depth case study of a French cluster in the video game industry, 
allowed us to analyze the network governance system and to understand its main objectives and 
purposes and the challenges and problems it has to deal with during its evolution. Our results permitted 
us to highlight the functioning of the network governance and how it occurs during the evolution of the 
network  and  the  ways  in  which  governance  is  adapted  to  the  imperatives  of  the  network  and  its 
evolution. We refer to this process of functioning and its evolution as “governance work” and explain it 
further  in  our  discussion.  Our  results  shed  also  light  on  the  necessity  of  dissociating  network 
governance effectiveness from the network performance. Whereas the achievement of network high 
performance  and  the  attainment  of  the  collaboration  collective  goals,  set  voluntarily  or  emerging 
throughout the evolution of the network, are among the primary functions of network governance, our 
results showed that it would be dangerous for practitioners and misleading for theorizing to blend both 
network performance and network governance effectiveness. Beyond the achievement of the collective 5	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goals of the network, the governance system, and thus one of its effectiveness criteria, should aim at 
evaluating the relevance and suitability of these objectives to the economic reality of the network.  
This contribution is structured as follows: a first section is dedicated to describing the data collection and 
explaining the adopted methodology. A second one introduces some of the results highlighted in this 
research focusing in particular on a depiction of the network governance system and how governance 
work occur throughout the evolution of the network and its mutation. The discussion links the principal 
contributions of our work to the existing literature and analyzes the possible extensions of the results to 
other contexts. 
 
Methodology and research context 
We have chosen to focus on the video games industry which, as a creative industry, displays distinctive 
characteristics  and  features,  making  it  an  interesting  field  for  a  comprehensive  investigation  of 
governance in the network context. The literature on creative industries has revealed the tendency of 
firms for clustering in tight agglomerations and their reliance on projects and intense social interactions 
for the organization of their production activities. Networking is a main features and an important activity 
both at the organizational and the individual level. This predominance of inter-organizational and inter-
individual  relationships  are  due  mainly  to  the  ambiguity  of  product  markets  and  technologies,  the 
pervasive uncertainties that weigh on production and innovation outcomes and the rapid configurations 
of projects according to markets and technologies evolutions.  The social and production networks 
introduce some stability into these rapidly evolving industries and help bind together collective and 
individual actors into more enduring relationships than those associated to the short-duration projects 
that characterize this industry. It also provides a fertile and dense ground that allows the formation of 
inter-organizational projects and their smooth functioning, the creation of interdependencies and their 
adequate leveraging. The external portfolio of relationships and the embeddedness of a firm play as 6	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much an important role as its resources endowments and idiosyncratic competencies (Aoyama & Izushi 
2003, Cohendet & Simon 2007, DeFillippi et al. 2007, Grabher 2002, Humphreys 2008, Johns 2005, 
Caves, 2002).   
To  study  the  issues  of  interest  within  the  video  games  industry  as  thoroughly  as  possible,  we 
conducted, first, 17 exploratory interviews with experts, well-known professionals and senior managers 
within the industry (Studios, Publishers, Suppliers and service providers, Business associations, Public 
Agencies, research institutes and key persons in ministries). We also attended professional events and 
meetings of many well-known business associations in the industry (governmental and private). We also 
collected secondary data about the industry in general and firms operating in this industry and their 
products. In line with our main question of research, our aim was to identify the prevailing forms of 
collaborative arrangements in this industry and in a second step choose a network whose specific 
features would enhance the generalization potential and external validity of our study.  
The comprehensive aims of this research call for inductive design and a case study approach that can 
be used ultimately in theory development. We used qualitative data collection, analysis, and reasoning 
methods as developed in the literature (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Lincoln & Guba 1985, Hlady-Rispal 
2002, Yin 1994 ; Eisenhardt 1989 ; Langley 2007). Inductive case-based methodology is considered to 
be an appropriate way to explore new research issues and build testable theoretical propositions (Yin, 
1994; Eisenhardt 1989). 
In order to address the present research issues, we analyzed the case of Capital Games, which is the 
cluster reuniting most of the video game companies located on the region Ile-de-France (IDF). It counts 
around 40 members which represent more than 60% of the main activities of the video game industry in 
France. Capital Games seems an interesting case to study for both its history and the features it 
displayed  (used  here  interchangeably  with  cluster).  Clusters  are  common  territorial  networks  with 
specific features that make them interesting for the investigation of network governance (Bathelt et al. 
2004, Bell 2005, Ehlinger et al. 2007, Gereffi et al. 2005, Gordon & McCann 2000, Humphrey & Schmitz 7	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2002, Porter 1998, Saxenian 2000). Its strong embededdness within the local context (Granovetter, 
1985) is also an important factor for our analysis. Capital Games has been created in 2003 as a LPS 
(local productive system) which is a label recognized by local authorities. This formal basis is also 
present in the legal status of the network which is an “association 1901”. The formal side of Capital 
Games co-exists with a strong informal structure of personal relationships which ties many of the 
participants. Members collaborate within oriented and collective actions and projects carried out by 
Capital Games, but they also collaborate outside of the network for their normal business deals and 
projects. One of the key aims of the network is to provide a platform for hosting R&D projects around 
which many companies could gather especially when these projects are too huge or too uncertain to be 
carried  by  a  single  firm.  The  network  presents  also  of  variety  of  aims  and  is  not  only  limited  to 
production and efficiency finalities. Among its many functions, the cluster plays also the role of an 
intermediary linking the video game companies of the region to the local collectivities and political 
authorities. Thus it acts as a privileged representative of the local firms and one of its main aims is to 
defend the interests of the studios, centralize their demands and needs and negotiate aids and rights for 
the sake of the industry at the regional level.  Moreover, one of the main objectives of the cluster is to 
bring together the different firms and introduce them to each other and thus contribute to the creation 
and maintenance of a dense and favorable ground for collaboration among the different companies in 
the  region.    Besides,  our  investigation  shows  that  the  network  has  evolved  in  size  and  scope  of 
activities, an evolution which, at some point, had led to a crisis in the functioning and direction of the 
network and almost resulted in the dissolution in its dissolution. Important efforts of restructuration, 
which involved a rethinking of the governance system, its objectives and tools, have been undertaken. 
Now, the cluster is emerging from this restructuring phase. Opinions are unanimous about the success 
of this restructuring. For our analysis, this restructuring is an important factor for the understanding of 
network governance and its effectiveness.       8	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We conducted a total of 22 semi-structured interviews between March 2009 and May 2010 with the 
managerial and administrative staff, members of the board of directors and the most active members, 
which have been identified with the aid of the general director. Each interview lasted between one and 
three hours, and was tape-recorded and retranscribed. In order to get complementary information, we 
also carried out secondary data collection and analyses (e.g. website, official documents) both before 
and  after  the  interviews.  Furthermore,  we  gathered  archival  and  attended  many  meetings  like  the 
General Assemblies, workshops organized by the cluster and launching projects meetings to get an 
idea of the main characteristics of the network but also to observe governance in action and how it is 
carried  out.  Thus,  our  method  allowed  us  to  triangulate  data  sources  and  the  collected  empirical 
material.  
During our data collection, our aim was to understand the multiple facets of governance, the purposes it 
serves and the way cluster organize collective actions to achieve its main objectives. We invited the 
interviewees  to  describe  the  activities  and  organization  of  the  cluster  and  the  general  issues  and 
challenge the network faces in its daily activities and how these difficulties are managed. We also tried 
to trace back the evolution of the network and understand the transformations it had undergone and 
their implications for its governance.  
Our data analysis was conducted as instructed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Lincoln & Guba 
(1985) with iterative and frequent goings back-and-forth from data to literature. We aimed to develop 
cohesive constructs through a systematic linking between our findings and the existing concepts and 
frameworks in the literature. Thus, at first, we proceeded to a content analysis in broad categories.  We 
tried  to  identify  the  governance  actors,  its  purposes  and  objectives  (dissociated  from  the  network 
objectives) and the mechanisms and tools which are being used to achieve these purposes. However, 
we felt this analysis was static and there were different dynamics and interactions at play which needs 
processual thinking in our analysis and in the handling of the main concepts. This proved helpful and 
relevant. Our findings highlight the processual nature of governance. In order to fathom what network 9	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governance refers to, we identified the purposes of governance and its endeavors. Then we focused on 
the sequence of events and interactions that allow for the achievement of these purposes and functions. 
During this phase, we tried to make out if some actions or sequences of activities are intended to attain 
some precise purposes more than others. Thus, we would be able to highlight some patterns in the way 
sequences of activities are oriented towards the achievement of governance purposes. We also tried, 
whenever it was possible to highlight the mechanisms of governance that are being used and identify 
the direct purpose(s) they serve.   
 
Main results 
Since the creation of the cluster, the formal structure of governance is organized around two mains 
actors: the board of directors and the executive committee. This organization is very similar to what can 
be observed in the classic hierarchical context. The idea behind this design and the separation of the 
decision rights from their execution is to ensure that the network and its main actions reflect and take 
into account the main interests and needs, if not of all its members, at least of the main majority and 
within the limit of the available resources.  
The board of directors is constituted of 8 members who are elected on a democratic basis every three 
years. These members elect among themselves a president. Stemming from the legal status of the 
cluster,  the  president  and  the  secretary-treasurer  are  its  legal  representatives  and  as  such  are 
accountable for their actions in front of the legal institutions (courts…). Accordingly, their rights and their 
scope of actions are more important.   
Whereas the board members are chosen among the network participants and generally are CEO and 
founders of companies belonging to the cluster, the members of the executive committee are not 
necessarily entrepreneurs and just are required to have a good understanding and expertise of the 
specificities of the industry. The general director is appointed by the board members. He is an employee 10	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of the network. Depending on the resources available, the general director, after the approbation of the 
board members, can appoint different collaborators to help him in the daily management of the cluster. 
The president is more involved, than the rest of the board members, in the daily functioning of the 
cluster and collaborates directly with the general director.  
The activities and projects carried out by the cluster are structured around five main themes which are 
(1) the Research and Development, (2) Export and international development, (3) Human resources, (4) 
Financing, and (5) business development. The selection of these main orientations has also been the 
result of a democratic consultation. Studios and companies were invited to express their main concerns 
and needs and to specify the areas where there were a need for a collective and mutualized action at 
the regional and industrial level. This informal selection process occurred through different formal and 
informal meetings between the general director and firms’ managers. These five directions and domain 
of actions have been selected during the creation of the cluster and since then haven’t changed much. 
However,  the  relative  importance  and  the  resources  allocated  to  each  theme  have  evolved  in 
accordance  to  the  important  changes  that  occurred  in  the  industry.  For  example,  international 
development which had been a secondary focus in the beginning has evolved and is now one of the 
main preoccupations of the cluster.   
The actions of the cluster are destined to the satisfaction of different and specific goals which are 
renewed continually. But, they are generally in line with one or more of the five themes identified above. 
The concrete actions of the cluster are varied. For the most part, the cluster takes on the role of a 
partner on different projects that involve two or more network members. For many cases, the launching 
of the project is encouraged by the cluster and follows the identification, by the cluster, of different 
needs or potential interdependencies and mutualization. Even if the cluster (mainly the members of the 
executive committee) does not intervene during the project as an active collaborator especially when 
the main objectives are directly related to the production or development of new technologies and 
games,  it  remains  in  the  backstage  and  keeps  a  role  of  coordinator  and  facilitator  of  the  inter-11	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organizational collaboration. The collective actions of the cluster can also take the form of coaching. 
The cluster helps its members for specific actions like their international or business development. One 
of the main primary roles of Capital Games is to orient firms to potential partners (whether private or 
public). The cluster plays also the role of a networking platform, even if other local actors endorse also 
this role, whether directly by helping firms and orienting them in their selection of partners or simply by 
providing occasions for informal discussions and exchange of knowledge like the thematic workshops 
organized occasionally. The intermediary role of the cluster leads generally the cluster to act as the 
main representative of the video games companies of the region especially for negotiation with public 
actors and during the development of collective conventions with these actors. The gathering of funds 
and subsidies for the mutual projects is also one of the main purposes that Capital Games serves. The 
lack of understandings of the peculiar features of this industry by the politics and thus the inadequacy of 
many existing institutions, laws, norms and standards was also a strong factor behind the creation of the 
cluster.  
The resources of the network are provided by the membership fees which are due once per year and 
are proportional to the annual profit of the firm. However, the total amount gathered represents a small 
portion of the real charges induced by the cluster. The major part of the financial resources comes from 
the governmental and local authorities’ aids and subsidies. On the other hand, the concrete functioning 
of the network and projects that are carried out is highly dependent on the voluntary participation of the 
members and their contribution in terms of skills, competencies and working time. Thus, as expressed 
by our interviewees, the implication of the network’ members is deemed fundamental for its success and 
continuous existence.  
Concerning the governance process, the general functioning of the network is based on an iterative and 
constant coming back-and-forth between the members’ needs and expectations on the one hand and 
on the other hand the actual actions and projects that are carried out by the cluster. The executive staff 
is generally and continuously gathering information from the network members. As specified by the 12	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general director “one of our missions is to be always listening to the field”. The objectives of the 
collective actions of the network are supposed to stem from the members and be representative of the 
interests of the majority. This continuous flow of information based on the frequent interactions of the 
executive staff with the network members and their personal social networks helps them to identify the 
future actions and orientations for the cluster and their concrete expression into short-term projects and 
missions. The executive staff can also propose actions through a benchmarking of what is done in other 
regional clusters in France and outside, in other countries.   
These future actions, projects and missions are submitted afterward for approbation to the president 
and treasurer and ultimately to the board of directors. The local authorities can also intervene during the 
determination and the selection of the collective actions and projects that will be developed in the 
cluster. This intervention is however not direct but is possible through the funds and financing solutions 
that the local authorities provide and thus it gives them some kind of rights and authority. According to 
the resources available a selection can be done among the propositions submitted by the executive 
committee. On the other hands propositions for future collective actions and projects can be made by 
the board’s members who are also video games professionals and thus can have an accurate view of 
what is needed for the industry’s sake at the regional level. The selection decisions are generally driven 
by two formal factors: first the satisfaction of the majority interests and second the feasibility of the 
collective actions within the limit of the available resources. However, more informally, the selection 
decisions can also be motivated by fairness principles. Often, the projects are pushed forward by a 
number of network’s participants. Executive staff and board members alike feel it is fair, whenever it is 
not against the majority principle, to privilege the projects and collective actions brought by active 
members in the cluster’s live and previous or actual projects.  
Generally, after this selection phase, an agenda is approved and the projects and joint actions can be 
launched and resources are committed. The propositions submitted include detailed descriptions of the 
resources needed, the potentials participants and their commitment and the advantages and benefits 13	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expected from the joint action or project. Besides, the initial agreements (whether formal or informal) 
must specify the modalities of sharing concerning the added value that will result from the collective 
action. The role of the executive staff, depending on the collective action or project which is being 
undertaken can vary in its intensity and scope. The amount of the resources brought by the cluster, 
determine the role that the executive staff members can play afterwards. Thus on certain projects like 
the video game festival for example or for collective actions such as negotiations with local authorities 
and  elaboration  of  collective  conventions,  the  cluster  can  play  a  very  active  role  including  the 
coordination of joint actions, division and achievements of different tasks. Generally the role of the 
cluster is limited to bringing advice and shouldering the firms carrying the project during its evolution. 
However, the minimum expected of the cluster is a controlling role to verify the respect of the initial 
agreements and the effective accomplishment of the collective action. It is also expected to intervene 
when conflicts arise especially concerning the sharing of the created value.  
The  process  described  here  is  not  however  a  linear  and  straightforward  one.  It  involves  many 
overlapping  and  iterative  ongoings  between  the  different  sequences.  Often,  they  involve  a  certain 
bargaining and coming back-and-forth between the executive staff members and the participants or 
between the staff members and the board of directors. It generally also requires compromises efforts on 
both sides especially regarding the resources that will be committed, their allocation, the number of 
participants, the perimeter of the collective action, allocation of decision rights. The thorniest question in 
this process is the sharing of the added value that will result from the joint actions and projects.  
The staff members can face many difficulties and challenges associated with these processes. The 
cluster and its functioning are based for the most part on voluntary contributions and investments from 
the network members. The aims of the cluster and its collective action generally benefit the whole 
industry  or  a  large  group  of  companies.  They  are  generally  not  directly  linked  to  the  production 
processes of the firms or they are associated to high uncertainties especially concerning the R&D 
projects. Many of the advantages and positive outcomes created are only available on the long run. 14	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Thus, as for the case for collective goods (Agarwal 2001; O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007), the incentives for 
voluntary  contribution  to  the  collective  action  are  weak,  too  uncertain  or  not  enough  aligned  and 
proportional to the initial investments brought by a member. The incentives for non participation or 
opportunistic behavior are on the other side important, since many outcomes are available for all the 
members without any real participation on their behalf apart from the membership fees (information, 
studies, workshops, collective public conventions….).      
Moreover, there are no legal contracts or agreements which can bind the participants (normal members 
or board members alike apart from the president and the treasurer). Many forms of collective action are 
launched simply with only informal agreements based on the goodwill of the members and degree of 
trust  between  them  and  the  staff  or  board  members.  Certain  projects  which  are  launched  as 
consortiums for example can bind the participants and offer legal protection and tools. But, generally, 
there is no legal mean to hinder participants from withdrawing after the beginning or halfway throughout 
the evolution of the joint action or project.  These features make the tasks of control and value sharing 
among participants very difficult for the staff members. Besides, accountability is not always possible 
given the lack of clarity and details concerning the initial agreements. As described in the literature, 
informal agreements and mechanisms as trust and social pressure through reputation are mobilized to 
remedy to the inexistence of formal contracts and legal agreements. Generally the promise of future 
returns and the continuity of relationships serve also to control the members’ behavior and future 
expectations. However, the matter here is more about the incentives that will push the members to 
participate than the control and sharing of the created value. Like a virtuous cycle, in order to leverage 
the social mechanisms of control it is important to get enough members’ and participations that will 
generate  added  value  and  benefits  which  will  attract  other  members  and  thus  allow  the  smooth 
functioning of the process described above and its control.        
There are also others risks associated to this functioning. As our case study shows, there could be 
possible myopia concerning what would be advantageous for the industry’ sake. The lack of resources 15	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that  would  otherwise  have  been  used  for  a  formalized  data  collection  concerning  each  member’ 
expectations  and  need  is  the  main  cause.  Executive  staff  members  rely  generally  on  informal 
relationships, discussions and meetings to gather information about the possible future joint actions and 
the needs of each member individually and the need of the industry at the regional level. Thus one of 
the main objectives of the executive staff is to get as much members as possible to participate in the 
formal and less formal events, consultations and workshops.  
Moreover, one of the roles of the cluster is to uncover potential and dormant interdependencies and 
push their members into more collaborations and joint actions within the cluster’ projects scope but also 
outside of it. Because of the reliance on the social network of personal relationships of the executive 
committee members, the cluster could suffer from lock-in and serves the interests of a minority which do 
not necessarily coincide of the majority and the industry interests’. The lock-in could also stem from the 
“clique” effect due to the reliance on personal networks and which can lead to the closure of the 
boundaries of the cluster to new entrants. This problem is also accentuated by the rapid evolution of the 
industry structure and the categories of actors involved. The software and development activities were 
mainly carried out in the industry by classic studios producing games for consoles, however recently it 
extended to include new studios that develop web browser games, online games, games for new 
platforms such mobile phones…. As the main representative of the software and game development 
activities at the region level, the cluster needs to include these new actors within its scope. These two 
problems were among the major factors that have led to the crisis known by the cluster and which have 
almost led to its disappearance. The cluster was victim of its own success. Because of lack of resources 
and of many projects and joint actions and missions launched during the same time, the general director 
came to rely more and more on its personal relationships and network.     
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Throughout our observations, we can found similarities between the steps and objectives described 
here  and  what  governance  refers  to  in  the  classical  corporate  context.  Governance  devices  and 
mechanisms  are  crafted  in  order  to  allow  the  alignment  of  the  management  interests  (executive 
committee here) to those of the principal (participants represented by the board) (Fama & Jensen 1983, 
Denis & McConnell 2003, Erakoviç & Overall 2010, Burt, 1980). The governance process involves also 
the classic purposes of coordination, control and conflicts resolution. The process is a democratic one, 
and is based on the use of formal governance mechanisms such as the allocation of decision and 
property rights (O’Mahony & Ferraro 2007, Gottschalg & Zollo 2007). Positional roles are also used to 
allocate  authority  and  thus  regulate  the  interventions  and  interactions  between  the  different  actors 
involved in the cluster. However, and because of the voluntary basis of contribution and the lack of legal 
means that ensure accountability and prevent opportunistic behavior, governance rely also heavily on 
informal mechanisms such as trust, social control and reputation (Gulati & Nickerson 2008, Uzzi 1997, 
Powell 1990). Another critical purpose for governance is the formation of the network and of a sufficient 
volume of collective action and voluntary contributions that allow the use and leverage of social and 
informal mechanisms of governance and ensure that incentives are high enough to counterbalance the 
benefits of opportunistic behavior. Another critical factor and balance to found is about the sharing of the 
created value. Many contributions and “products” of the cluster are similar to collective goods (Agarwal, 
2001). The development of the industry at the regional level is one of the fundamental aims of the 
cluster which justify also the public funds it receives. However, this complicates the matter of the right 
incentives to provide and requires that the governance actors find a balance between fairness and 
efficiency in this case. Fairness dictates that each member receives benefits and outcomes that are 
proportional to its initial contribution and initial investment. Efficiency on the other hand requires that the 
created value benefits to the whole industry especially at the regional level.  
The iterative sequences described above are also similar to the process of negotiations-commitments-
executions used by Ring and Van de Ven (1994) to describe the development of cooperative inter-17	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organizational  relationships.  Assessment  is  achieved  for  each  stage  according  to  the  principles  of 
efficiency and equity. In our case, these two principles drive also the evolution of the governance 
process described here. However, in our observations, this process is repeated in a more or less 
systematic manner especially whenever new actions and projects are being undertaken by the cluster or 
new evolutions occur or are predicted in the industry (legal, technological….). Thus, if considered at one 
point in time, it is possible to observe many collective actions that are structured in different forms 
(projects, public conventions, workshops, accompanying missions….) and which are at different stages 
of evolution according to this sequence of negotiations-commitments-executions. Thus, governance 
involves also managing different micro-processes of negotiations-commitments-executions that occur at 
different levels and different points in time. 
From our observations, but also evidence is provided in the literature for this, governance is a set of 
different activities, set in motion, and geared toward the achievement of different aims. These aims do 
however evolve constantly as the main objectives of the network and its attributes evolve. They are also 
depending on the stage of the lifecycle of the network. Our findings allow us to put into light the 
processual nature of governance in the network context. Governance is a set of processes, or a “meta-
process”,  that  are  geared  toward  the  creation,  the  maintenance  and  the  evolution  of  collaboration 
relationships  and  the  network  as  a  collective  actor.  For  a  better  qualification  of  what  have  been 
observed,  we  refer  to  the  governance  functioning,  evolution  and  continuous  (re)  evaluation  as 
governance work.  As suggested by Langley (2004), “adding the word ‘work’ to any apparently static 
and structural concept is an interesting device for forcing consideration of how human agency might 
operate on it” (page 276). From what we observed, governance results from the interplay between 
different, ongoing, iterative, and tightly intricate processes aimed at the accomplishment of different 
purposes ranging from coordination, to control, conflicts resolution and value sharing. It also involves 
many purposes which are specific to the network context as the formation and maintenance of a strong 18	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basis and volume of voluntary participation and the crafting of informal and relational mechanisms and 
governance devices that helps to achieve control, efficiency and fairness.   
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